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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
AUSTIN RICE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ER1IA RICE, Executrix and Trustee, In 
the matter of the Estate of David L. 
Rice, Deceased, 
Defendarnt wnd Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7268 
In the matter of the estate of David L. Rice, de-
eeased, a decree of distribution was entered on December 
26, 1945. By said decree, Austin Rice, appellant, was 
awarded as his full distributive share of his father's 
estate 
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''Approximately 27 acres in Section 31, Town-
ship 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
now occupied hy him.'' 
Due notice of the hearing of the p·etition for distribution 
was given, and no appeal was taken from said decree. 
In October, 1946, this action was commenced to 
amend said decree on the ground, as stated in appellant's 
amended petition, that fraud had been practiced on the 
court and on ~ppellant : 
(a) By failure of respondent to set up in her peti-
tion that the ''approximately 27 acres'' above referred to 
included two tracts of land located east of the highway 
running betwee'n Centerville and Farmington, aggregat-
ing 3.85 acres ; 
(b) By her failure to represent to the court that 
the land awarded to appellant was en'titled to ten hours 
per w·eek water right from Davis Cre,ek as appurtenant 
to ap~pellant 's land and by failing to have said water 
right included in the decree. 
(c) By repiresenting to appellant and his wife at 
Farmington court house on the day the petition for dis-
tribution was heard: 
"That it would he unnecessary and a waste 
of time for them to attend said hearing or to be 
·present thereat, and that they did not need to do 
so, because she had taken care of everything for 
them, and that they would get the farm they then 
occupied as provided in the wiN.'' · 
And that relying on said statemen-ts, appeUant did 
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not attend said hearing and did not have his day in 
court. 
Respondent's general demurrer to said a~nended 
petition was sustained, and this court reversed said de-
cision on the ground that said amended petition con-
tained allegations of "·extrinsic fraud" \Y hich, if proved, 
would entitle petitioner to relief. 
The case \Yas tried, and the trial court found that 
r·espondent was not guilty of the fraudulent misrepre-
sentations alleged, or any fraud whatsoever, intrinsic 
or extrinsic, and that respondent did not make any state-
ment or do any act to prevent appellant from attending 
said hearing or having his day in court. See Findings 
11 and 14, Rec. 125, 126. However, the court found that 
David L. Rice: 
''After about the year 1919 did not use any 
water during his thirty-two-hour turn through the 
White Ditch, which extends south from Davis 
Creek and is the only ditch through which the 
said 27 acre tract could be supplied with water, 
but the court finds that after said Austin Rice 
took up his residence on the 27 acre tract in the 
Fall of 19~37, at times during the freshet season, 
and occasionally when the water was on turns, he 
used some water through the White Ditch, pre-
sumably with his father's permission, for the ir-
rigation of approximately 8 acres of orchard and 
garden, a part of the said 27 acre/ tract." (Find-
ing 8, par. 8, Rec. 124). 
And the court also found: 
''That at the time of the death of the said 
David/ Ij· Rice, there was appurtenant to all the 
irrigated land of his estate referred to in the evi-
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4 
dence, the thirty-two hours of water right herein-
before mentioned. That said David L. Rice did 
not use, and there was never appurtenant to said 
27 acre tract, a ten hour use of Davis Creek each 
week, but the court finds that by reason of the 
facts found in rpla11agraph 8 hereof, the proportion 
of said thirty-two hour p·eriod which is appurten-
ant to said 8 acres of the Austin Rice farm was, 
and is four hours, that is to say, from one o'clock 
A.M. until five o'clock A.M. Thursday morning of 
each week, which is the only water right from 
Davis Creek to which plaintiff is entitled.'' (Find-
ing 9, Rec. 124). 
The court held that the 27.71 described in the 
decree is the only lnnd to which appellant is en-
titled under the will. (Finding 8, Rec. 12'3.). 
Both parties appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for ap·pellant sets forth in his brief a sum-
mary of all testimony which he regards as favorable to 
himself and injects into the recital many unjustifiable 
interpretations, which we shall not take time to refute. 
The greater p'art of his hrief is devoted to a statement 
and argument with respect to what he considers to he in-
equities in the will of David L. Rice; to a discussion of 
what he claims was the use· made of wate-r from Davis 
Creek on the Austin Rice tract and the use claimed to 
have been made hy Austin Rice of tl1e 3.85 acres east of 
the highway. Couns·el has not only drawn one herring, 
but an entire case of herring, ancient and odorous, across 
the true trail of this law suit by ·the most p~rolix and 
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5 
tedious assertions as to the integrity and truthfulness 
of his (H\rn "itnesses and the unworthiness and un-
reliability of each and every -witness for respondent, hut 
he artfully and studiously avoids a discussion of the real 
questions ''Thich it is the duty of the court to determine 
on this appeal. 
THE \\TATER RIGHT 
\\r e refuse to be led into a discussion of a!ll the de-
tails of the evidence which reveal the disputes between 
appellant's witnesses and those of the appellee, further 
than to show that the overwhehning weight of the evi-
dence is to the effect that after the year 1919 (that is, 
for more than twenty-five years prior to his death), 
David L. Rice never attempted to make any use of the 
waters of Davis Creek through the White Ditch any 
time when the water was on turns, and that the only use 
of water ever 1nade on said property was during the 
freshet 3eason. 
Rawl Rice, forty-eight years of age, son of-David L. 
Riee, irrigated the Rice farms from his early boyhood up 
to 1929, ·exce}l't for 1917 and 1918 when he was in the 
army. He was familiar with the ditch leading north from 
Davis Creek to his father's orchard and farm lands, 
and with the ditch taken out lower down on Davis Creek 
' which alS"o runs north and under the highway to the 
Clover field, and he irrigated these orchard and farm 
lands every year (Tr. 107-8). He was also familiar 
\vith the White Ditch leading south from Davis Creek 
to\Val'd the Austin Rice tract, and testified that said 
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tract was not irrigated from said ditch ( Tr. 109, 113) ; 
that the Austin Ri:ce traet was wet and swampy, and that 
he constructed drains on said tract (Tr. 109-110), from 
which drains said tract was irrigated ( Tr. 112, 113, 125) ; 
and that all water from Davis Creek used by his father 
during the thirty-two hour ·period each week allotted 
to his father was diverted from said Cre·ek through the 
ditches that ran north to the orchard and farm lands 
and to the Glover field ( Tr. 114-115). 
J•ames 8. Rice, forty-one, another son of David L. 
Rice, was familiar with his father's farms and the irri-
gation thereof up to 1939 ( Tr. 130). He testified that 
ther·e were approximately sixty or seventy-five acres of 
orchard or other lands below the north ditches (Tr. 
131) ; that he assisted in irrigating each year, and that 
during his father's thirty-two hour turn, the water was 
taken out of the two north ditches (Tr. 132), and that 
no water was taken through the White Ditch to irrigate 
th·e Austin Rice truct ( Tr. 133) ; that the White Ditch 
was not -cemented un·til 1934, and after that date, as well 
as before, that tract was irrigated from drains (Tr. 134) 
and in no other way (Tr. 136). 
Le.Gratro~e Rice, forty-four, another son of David 
L. Rice, worked on his father's farms each year until 
1945, the ye1ar of his father's death· Exhibit 1 shows 
the Rice lauds, and L.eGrand tes·tified that during the 
thirty-two hour period, he took the water through the 
north ditches and irrigated a total of about eighty-·eight 
acres (Tr. 154, 155), and that up to 1945, no water but 
drain water was used on the Austin Rice tract ('Tr. 157). 
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1 ... oung Rau·l Rice, twenty-nine, a grandson of David 
L. Rice, \vorked on the place until he was twenty years 
of age (Tr. 189, 190); never knew of any water being 
used through the White Ditch to irrigate the Austin 
Rice tract and that said tract was irrigated from drains 
. ' 
(Tr. 190). 
All of these witnesses are corroborated by Roy 
Whz~te, \vho lives a quarter of a mile north of the Austin 
Rice property. White lmew \vho used the water through 
the White Ditch each year (Tr. 198); knew tl?-at David 
L. Rice took water through this ditch during the freshet 
season up to about 1919 (Tr. 199) ·when the ditch was 
\vashed out, at which time after vainly endeavoring to 
get the water through the ditch, he said to 'Vhite: ''You 
take the water, I give up," and White s'ays that David 
L. Rice abandoned the idea of getting water down that 
ditch (Tr. 200-201). 
T"al GZover, familiar with the use of water through 
the White Ditch. He lives one block south of the Austin 
Rice land, knew that land to be swampy and boggy (Tr. 
214); knew of water from the White Ditch being used 
there t\venty-five years ago "during the flush P'art of 
the season" (Tr. 216), but since that time never saw 
the land irrigated except from drains (Tr. 218). 
Clyde Wiloox, fifty-eight, was fami1liar with the 
use of the White Ditch all his lif.e except during the ten 
year~ from 1914 to 1924. He never kn·ew of David L· 
Rice using water on the Austin Rice tract prior to 1914 
or after 19·24 ( ~rr. 228-229). He saw David L., Raw I and 
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LeGrand water the Austin Rice place from drains (Tr. 
229). 
This evidence prepondera;tes against the testimony 
of Austin Rice and his wife. The latter, of course, could 
testify only as to the period subsequent to 1937 when they 
took possession of the tract in quesition. She testified 
that from 1935. to 1940, her children incTeased in num-
bers from 'three to nine (Tr. 51); and that in 1948, she 
had eleven, all of whom she personally cared for with-
out help ('Tr. 56); yet she stated that she was with her 
husband and assisted in irrigating his place from nine 
o'clock Wednesday evening to seven o'clock Thursday 
morning (ten rhours) every week, every year after 1937 
(Tr. 53, 54). Is i't possible to believe such statements? 
The only other witnesses for appellant were : 
Irvin Hughes, forty-eight, who stated that so far as 
he knew, Austin used the water of Davis Creek only 
during ''the last few years sin0e he has been living on 
the p·roperty," (Tr. 269) but on cross-examination, he 
stated that he had never seen water diverted from the 
White Ditch to the Austin Rice land (Tr. 271) except a 
long time ago when he was a boy (Tr. 272). 
Davrid R. L·und, wh1o testified that he last saw David 
L. Rice irrigate the Austin Rice land from Davis Creek 
from 1908 to 1915 (Tr. 281) and in 19·2'1-23 during the 
freshet season (Tr· 284) and knew nothing about the 
use of the water after 1923 (Tr. 285). 
McQuis-ton, who manifested a great anxiety to sup~ 
port the plaintiff's claims, knew nothing about the Austin 
Rice place except during 'th·e last four or five years, and 
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he testified that Austin used the water ·through the 
'Vhite Ditch not only during the night time, but in the 
mornings and afternoons as well (Tr. 292-293). 
Clearly the great \veight of the evidence is against 
the contention that Austin Rice is entitle~d to ten hours 
-of water per \veek, .and there is no ~evidence whatsoever 
that he teas, or is enti.tled to four hours ,as fownd by the 
court. There is not a scintilla of proof that D:avid L. 
R-ice et~ e r _allotted the particular ten hours, orr any "ben 
hours, or any four hours, ~or any hours, bo the Austin 
Rice property, ~or that he ever reguZarly, o.r ~at ~all, ir-
rigated that tract during the ten hours cZaimed, or an;y 
ten or any four hours, ·or at ;all, except drurling the frreshe:t 
season priorr to 1919. W:hy would he devote one-third 
of his water right to the irrigation of eight or nine acres 
(al'l the land in the Austin Rice tra~t that Mrs. Rice (Tr. 
57) or Austin (Tr. 75) claims was in need of irrigation) 
through a ditch which would not hold water until after 
it was cemented in 193~ (Tr. 200-2:11), when he had up·-
wards of seventy acres of orchard and other lands, which 
the testimony shows cannot he p·rofitahly used without 
the entire thirty-two hours~ (Tr. 160, 1911) 
THE 3.85 ACRES 
The dispute in the evidence so far as concerns Aus-
tin's use of the 3.85 acres on the east side of the highway 
is just as 1narked, and we sha;ll not take time or space to 
discuss in detail the testimony on that question. S·uf-
fiee it to say that the trial court found that the weight 
of the evidence was against ap~pellant's contention. Fur-
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thermore, whether water was used on the Austin Rice 
tract, or whether he used the barn and corral property, 
or whether the value of what was devised to him by his 
father was more or less than other heirs will eventually 
receive, (a point made mueh of by appellant) or whether 
Erma Rice in presenting her petition for final distribu-
ti'on was under obligation to represent to the court what 
she did not helieve to be the fact, to-wit, that the Austin 
Rice tract was entitled to ten hours of water from Davis 
Creek, is all hesi'de the real question for determination 
on this appeal. 
NECES:SlARY TO SHOW EXTRINSIC FRAUD 
Will the court please bear in mind that the deeree 
of distribution was entered on December 26, 1945, and 
that there was no ap·peal from said decree, and that this 
is an action in equity to amend said decree on the g~ro'UIIU], 
that the s1ame was p~nocu.red by frood. To appeUant's 
amended complaint, respondent demurred generally, and 
on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The general de-
murrer was sustained, and appellant appealed and de-
fendant assigned cross-error hecause the court overruled 
her demurrer to the jurisdiction. This court held that 
the trial court was right in overruling the demurrer for 
lack of jurisdiction, but held that there was error in sus-
taining respondent's general demurrer· 
Referring to the amended complaint, this court de-
clared: 
''Being lirmited ~o his ·rel~e f in .equity, has the 
petitioner stated facts in his p·etition sufficient 
to constitute a cause of action against the execu-
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trix and trustee? To do so, he must allege facts 
to sho"~ fraudulent acts or conduct on the part 
of the executrix sufficient to establish 'extrimsic 
frau.d'.'' (Italics ours). 
The court then quotes from the authorities 'vhich 
announce the principle underlying such an artion, as fol-
lo\\Ts: 
'· 'In all these cases and many others which 
have been examined, relief has been granted on 
the ground that by some fraud practiced directly 
upon the party seeking relief against the judg-
ment or decree, that party has been prevented 
from :presenting all of his case to the court'.'' 
This court then remarks: 
''Equity will relieve one seeking relief from 
the effect of a judgment or decree pTocured by 
conduct of the successful party which prevents 
the injured party from appearing at the hearing 
or trial on the merits. Under the present state 
of the record, this court must assume the e~ecu­
trix knowingly and wilfully made misrepresenta-
tions to the petitioner which prevented him from 
appearing ~at the he~aring and ob"baimilng the prop-
e'f'ty that he cZaims should have be,en his. Pre-
dicated on these alleged fraudulent acts, petitioner 
was denied his day in court.'' (Italics ours). 
Later in the opinion, the court declares: 
''Judged by the allegations of the p~etition in 
this action, petitioner has been deceived to his 
prejudice, and a grave injustice would he per-
petrated if petitioner could esbablish the alleged 
facts, yet was denied the opportunity of proving 
them.'' (Italics ours). 
In re R.ice 's Estate -------- Ut~h -------- 182 Pac. ( 2) 
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111, 117-118. The court then holds that the trial court 
erred in sustaining the general demurrer and that as the 
trial court did not state the reasons for his ruling, the 
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend his 
petition if he so desired. No subsequent amendment to 
the petition was filed, except one relating to the actual 
area or quantity of land lying wes't of the highway, that 
is to say: by an amendment, petitioner claims that by 
reason of the railroad rights of way there are only 
twenty-five acres instead of appr-oximately 27.71 acres, 
which the decree purports to award to plaintiff, but as 
to the fraud,claimed, the only allegations are those which 
were before this court on the former appeal. Now 
what are those allegations of extrinsic fraud~ 
''That on the day set for the hearing of the 
petition of Erma Rice, executrix, for the approval 
of her final account and for decree of distribution 
herein, petitioner and his wife went to the court 
house at Farmington, Davis County, Utah, to at-
tend the; session of the above entitled court that 
was to hear said petition of said Erma Rice, exe-
cutrix, at said time and place, and that thereupon, 
.and 1p1rior to said he,aring of s,a,id pe1t'ition, on the 
same ~ay and in the hallw'aty .outside the cowrt 
room in said oourt house, the s:ai.d Erma Rice n~et 
your petit~oner and his wife and, advised them 
that it W10Uld be wnneoessary rand Ia Wlast~e of time 
for them to attrt1.end the he:artifng or to be present 
there1a:t, arnd that they did not need to do so be-
O(JJUse she had taken oare of everythilng for them, 
and that they w:ould get the farm they t'hen oc-
cupied ,as provided forr im s~aid will; that relying 
upon said representations of the said Erma Rice, 
all of which were untrue and then known to her to 
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be untrue, yo11Jr petitioner did no~t ,(J)tltend the 
hearitng of said peti~on of Erma Rice, execu,trix, 
and did not kno"~ until shortly before the filing 
of this petition that said Erina Rire had not ac-
curately represented to the court the proper de-
scription of the farn1 occ,upied by your petitioner, 
and did not kno'v until shortly before the filing 
of this p~etition that the water used on and ap-
purtenant to the farm \Yas not included in the 
cleeree of distribution, and did not know that the 
rep·resentations of the said Erma Rice that she 
had properly taken care of his rights and interests 
were false and untrue·" (Rec. 78). 
Please bear in mind this is the only. allegation of 
e:1·trinsic fraud, if such it can be termed, in the entire 
petition. There is not one scintilla of evidence in sup~ 
port of this allegation. It affinnative1ly appears from 
the evidence that Erma Rice did not ''p,rior to said hear-
ing in the hallway outside of the court room in said court 
house'' meet petitioner and his wife. His wife testified 
that she was not present on that occasion and was not 
at the court house when the petition for distribution 
was heard (Tr. 44-45). So that the aliegation that Erma 
Rice made any statement ''to your p:et~tioner a;nd his 
wife'' at the time the petition for distribution was heard 
is utterly false. Austin Rice testified that he was not 
at the court house at that hearing, and that the only time 
he was at the court house was in the Sp~ringtime when 
the will was offered for probate, at which time Erma 
told hin1 everything would be taken care of, and there 
was no use for him to stay, and so he went away (Tr. 
98-100). Appellant's counsel endeavored to have the 
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witness change his testimony, but was unsuccessful fTr. 
100-101). Respondent testified that Austin was in the 
court ro(om when the wil1l was offered for probate (Tr. 
230) which accords with Austin's testimony. In fact, 
she invited him to be present (Tr. 230). Whether he 
remained for the hearing, or went away is immaterial 
because no eomp!laint is made of the will itself or of the 
probate thereof. Resrpondent also testified that appel-
lant was at the hearing of the petition fnr distribution 
and remained until the proceedings were concluded. (Tr· 
232); but she testified that she did not have any con-
versation with him on that occasion (Tr. 240-241). There-
fore, if as Austin declares, the only time he was at the 
court hous·e was iJn the Sp~ring when the will was offered 
for ·probate, then at the time the decree of distributi~on 
was entered, Erma did not say, and could not have said 
anything to him as alleged in the complaint to induce his 
absence or to pTevent him from having his day in court. 
If on the other hand, he was present at the December 
hearing as Erma testified (Tr. 232), then her testimony 
that she had no conversati1on with him, except to pass 
the time of day, stands uncontradicted. In either event, 
there is not a scintiHa of p~roof of any act of Erma's that 
deprived Austin from having his day in court, so there 
was, and could be no '' ext:rinsic'' fraud. Therefore, 
there is nothing in ·the evidence sustaining the allega-
tions of the p~etition; therefore, no cause is shown for 
upsetting a final decrHe after the e~p~iration of the time 
for appeal. 
The decree of distribution could only be attacked 
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for fraud, and it must, as this court has declared, be ex-
t.rinsic fraud, and such declaration is in accord with all 
the Utah cases on the subject. 
In lreyant r. [Ttah Savim.gs & Trust C~o., 54 Utah 181, 
this language is used : 
··This court is co1nmitted to the doctrine con-
tended for by counsel for appellant, namely, _!Pat 
probate proceedings are in rem, and that where 
the statutory notice has been given all who are 
interested in the estate are hound by all orders 
or decrees duly entered in a particular case, and 
that, ordinarily, the only remedy is by direct ap-
peal. Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 
522, 37 L.R.A. ( N ."S.) 368. This court has also 
held that judgments and decrees entered by courts 
of competent jurisdiction, where jurisdiction of 
the subject of the action and of the person has 
been legally acquired, can only be assailed on di-
rect appeal or in equity for ·extrinsic as contra-
distinguished from intrinsic fraud. Cantwell v. 
Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 
Pac. 986. 
In Anderson v. State, 615 Utruh 512, 517, the court 
~nnouneed the rules by which an equity court is limited 
in setting aside judgments. In that case it was a~leged 
in the complaint that "Cora Ray and her mother, Alice 
Ray * * * conspired and confederated together to sup-
press and conceal'' certain facts. Says the court: 
"In order to obtain a decree vacating a judg-
Inent forma1lly entered by a court having juris-
diction of the subject-matter and the parties on 
the ground of fraud, a court of equity is limited 
by 1nany rules, more or less inflexible: First the 
fraud relied on must be extrinsic, and not f;arud 
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which oovuld have b~een app·rehended and met in 
the tnval -of the cas1e w·hich resutted in the judg-
rn.ent c~omplaine.d of; second, it should appear to 
the satisfaction of the equity tribunal that had 
it 1~ot been for the fraud the judgment would no.t 
have b~een rernd,e;red; third, the fraud, and the ef-
fect thereof, should he made to appear beyond a 
reas1owable doubt; and, fourth, the ·party seeking 
the relief must have been free from negligence 
in the trial of the case in which the judgm·ent was 
rende_red. To these ru'les may be added another, 
recognized and enforced in most jurisdictions, in-
cluding our own, that mere p-erjury, committed 
in the trial of the case in which the judgment was 
rendered, is not such fraud as will authorize the 
court to vacate the judgm·ent. Cantwell v. Thatch-
er Bros· Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 Pac. 986." 
(Italics ours). 
The court quotes with app·rnvwl this statement from 
Dringer v. Erie Ry. ·Co., 42' N. J. Eq. 573, 8 Atl· 811: 
''A court of equity may unquestionably an-
nul a judgment or decree which has been ob-
tained by fraud, hut, in order to justify such an 
exercise of power, it must be made clearly to ap-
pear that the judgment or decree has no other 
foundation than fraud; in other words, it must be 
made to appear ·that if there had been wo· fraud, 
there w~ould have been wo judg·mevn.t or de:eree. An 
attempt to exercise a wider or more liberal juris-
diction, in cases of this class, would, it witl be 
perceived, necessarily ·enlarg-e the jurisdiction of 
courts of ·equity so as to make them, practically, 
courts for the review of the judicial acts of other 
tribunals, and not tribunals with just sufficient 
power to redress frauds hy undoing what fraud 
has done. * * * A simple statement of the ground 
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upon 'vhich jurisdiction in such cases rests shows 
that,. unless the decree assailed is shown to he 
the sole and ·direct product Df the f'riamd charged 
this court has no authority whatever either to an-
nul or change it, for its jurisdiction is unalterably 
limited to the simple undoing of what fraud has 
done. It is therefore, clear that, if this decree 
has any other foundation than the fraud here 
charged, this court, even if convinced that the 
decree is unjust according to the real right of the 
case, cannot disturb it." (Italics ours). 
See also Wri.ght v. C~onst,ruction C.o., 108 Utah 28, 
where the court again declares that even if tihe judg-
ment \vas procured by perjured testimony, equity \vill 
not set aside the judgment for such "intrinsic" fraud. 
A·pplying the rule in Anderson vs. Stat,e, supra, can 
it be said that if all the testimony presented to this 
Court had been before Judge Hendricks in a hearing on 
objections duly made to the p·etition for distribution, he 
W1ould have render-ed '0/YIJY different decree o:f distrribu-
t~on? Has there been, in this case, proof of fraud beyond 
a reas~onable doubt or -p·roof of any fraud~ Was a~pell­
ant fr;ee from negligence in failing to object to the peti-
tion or in failing to appea~l ~ The record does not show 
that respondent did one thing to pirevent him from doing 
either. Counsel says she did not object to his using the 
water in 1945 and 1946 and that such act lured him into 
foregoing hi~s right to appeal. This is just plain non-
sense because if it were true that respondent failed to 
object to his use of the water in 1945, before the petition 
for distribution was filed, that could have no possible 
bearing upon whether or not he was negligent after the 
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filing of the petition in not examining it, in not object-
ing to it, and in not appealing from it within three 
months after December 26, 1945. As to his use of the 
water in 1946, it appears that defendant did make ob-
jeetion, and whatever use he made of the water that year, 
whether befor:e or after defendant objected, was after his 
time for appeaJl had already expired (Mareh 26, 1946). 
If there was any failure to disclose facts (which we 
deny) it would have been "intrinsic" fraud. If the 
petition for distribution had be·en contested, could not 
Judge Hendricks have very well declined to accept appell-
ant's version -of the evidence as to the use of the water~ 
And if such might well have been the attitude of the 
court, it cannot now be said that there is even a proba-
bility, much less a certainty, that a different decree would 
have been entered. Judge Cowley declined to agree with 
appeltants contention with all the evidence before him. 
Res·pondent testified that she had not heard her 
father or the boys ever S'ay that Austin's land was en-
titled to any water from Davis Creek (Tr. 2'38), and 
she had a personal knowledge with res1pect to the mat-
ter (Tr. 238). She honestly presented her petition for 
distribution on the basis of her understanding that there 
was no water right for Aus1tin's land (Tr· 232), and she 
acted in entire good fa,ith without any intention of de-
ceiving the -court or Austin ( Tr. 232-3). Furthermore, 
she carried out what she knew to he her father's in-
structions at the time the will was made in having de-
creed to Austin only the tract of land below the high-
way (Tr. 233-4). Her tes,timony of her father's declara-
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tion 'vas properly admitted. 69 C. J. 144, 148, 151; 
f.t~orthrup v. Columbian Lumber Co., 186 Fed. 770; L·o~ 
max v. Shinn, (Ill.) 44 N. E. 495; and Fly.'l'lln v. Holmatn, 
(Iowa) 94 N. W. 4±7. A reading of Erma's testimony 
will clearly show that she is an honest, conscientious per-
son, who "ranted always to do her duty as she under-
stood it and the court so finds. There is n1ot an intima-
tion of any fraudulent conduct on her part. 
INTRINSIC FRAUD 
But notwithstanding this court held that app·ellant's 
case n1ust be based on extrinsic fraud, ap·p·ellant con-
tends that it does not at all matter whether ·defendant 
"knowingly" or "wilfully" made any "misrepresenta.-
~vons which kep·t plaintiff from ·attendimg the. hearifng, 
if she failed to call the court's attention ,to the fact that 
there was a ten hour water right from _Wednesday night 
at nine o'clock until Thursday morning at seven o'clock 
of each week, ·and to also inform the court that ~plaintiff 
occupied the barn land· He claims that withholding of 
this information is of itself fraud, irre,sp·ective of de-
fendant's good faith; that even if she made a mistake, 
nevertheless, she w·as supp1osed to know, and that in 
presenting her petition and in obtaining the decree she 
was guilty of fraud by reason of her fiduciary relation 
to the plaintiff. Disregarding the theory of his case 
limited as it is, by this court to extrinsic fraud, and en-
tirely ignoring the only charge of fraud stated in his 
complaint which saved him in this Cuurt from th·e gen-
eral demurrer, he undertakes now to base his cas.e· -on 
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mtrirnsic fraud, that is, the alleged suppression of facts; 
the alleged erroneous rep~resentations in the petition for 
distribution, and the procurement of the decree, and 
he cites many cases. We have read the authorities cited 
by counsel, and there is not in the case at bar any of the 
elements, facts or conditions which form the basis for 
any of said decisions. Let us refer to a number of them 
as illustrative of all. 
LG!Il!Yb v. Kip,p, (Wis.) 145 N. W. 183, which was an 
action to restrain the enforcement of a judgment, the 
trustee deliberately exhibited and persistently urged 
upon the court a false financial statement omitting a 
$20,000 item which should have been charged against 
him, and which amount he had converted to his own use. 
The court found that he ''palmed off on aH parties a 
spurious, deceptive paper as a disclosure.'' A clear 
case of fraudulent purpose- and intent not present in 
the case at bar, and a case of intrinsic fraud. 
In Bohler v. Bohler, (Cal.) 67 Pac. 282, a widow en-
tered into a conspiracy with her son (not the son of her 
husband) and falsely and fraudulently represented to 
the court that the son was a child of the testator whereby 
she deceived the court and defrauded the infant chiidren 
of decedent. Here was active unconscionable intrinsic 
fraud. 
In Puritnton v. Dawson, (Cal.) 6:5 P'ac. (2d) 777, a 
residuary heir, with knowledge of a pretermitted heir, 
gave no notice of the proceeding to such heir and pur-
posely and intentionally kept such information from the 
court and secured a decree of all the. p-rop:erty to himself. 
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There ""as the further element in the complaint to quote 
the 'vords of the court: 
~'More S})ecifically it is alleged that a cor-
rupt agreement was entered into between Purin-
ton, ~frs. Potter's son, and Schaffer, whereby 
Schaffer agreed that if Purinton did not notify 
respondent that her grandmother had died and 
allowed the estate to be distributed according to 
the terms of the 'vill that Schaffer would make 
a will in his favor." 
The case is one of ''extrinsic'' fraud in failing to give 
notice to the heir, as well as active, corrupt and inten-
tional wrongdoing· 
In Kauffman v. McLaughlin, (O·kla.) 114 Pac. 929·, 
a trustee,· notwithstanding plain provisions of the wi'll 
giving plaintiff a one-fourth interest in certain land, 
the proceeds of the sale of which were to be he'ld for 
twenty-five years if plaintiff was not s·ooner found, pur-
posely withheld from the court information res.pecting 
the trust and secured a decree under a ~p,rovision of the 
wj.ll which gave no authority for such an action and de-
prived plaintiff of her interest. Active, premeditated 
intrinsic fraud. 
In Olivwa v. Grave, (Cal.) 12·2 Pa:c. 565, the ad-
ministratrix hrought suit against one known to-be men-
tally incompetent and intentionally concealed such fact 
from th·e court and had a defau1lt judgment entered 
against the incompetent. Probably extrinsic as well as 
intrinsic fraud. 
Mary Pickfot1d Co. v. B~aylf}y Brothers, (Cal.) 86 
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Pac. (2d) 102, is not in point at a'll for that case was an 
appeal from a judgment. 
Morrrrow v. B·oneb'fiaker, ('Kan.) 11'5 Pac. (2d) 585, 
appears to be an incorrect citation. 
In Larnabee v. Tracy, ('Cal·) 126 Pac. (2d) 947, the 
attorney, who was also ·executor, after repeatedly, in 
writing, reeognizing the rights of plaintiff as an heir 
of her deceased mother, deliberately represented to the 
court that such interest had laps-ed and by such fraud 
secured a decree eliminating the plaintiff. This same 
case was again bef'Ore the court in 134 Pac. ('2d) 275, 
where the court emph~sized the neglect of the attorney-
executor to give p1l,aintiff notice of his change of atti-
tude wirth respect to plain tiff's rights as an heir. Extrin-
sic and intrinsic fraud. 
In Benson v. Andersron, 10 Utah 135, the brother of 
deeedent secured all of de-cedent's property, including 
certain land where the widow of deeedent had been liv-
ing for thirty years and who was an old Danish woman 
who had a very poor understanding of the English langu-
age rand who was dependent wholly on others for infor-
mation as to her rights. The court held that it was 
obvious that the court had made such an error in dis-
regarding the plain provisions of the statute that in 
view of all the conditions, equity should protect the old 
lady from such a manifest injustice, hut the court re-
marked: 
"We do not intend to declare that a party to 
a pr_ohate proceeding may s·et by when an er-
roneous decree is entered against him and negli-
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gently pern1it the time for appeal to expire and 
depend on a bill in equity to correct it.'' 
Of course, 've con tend the decree in this case is not 
erroneous, but plaintiff had the right and the opp·or-
tunity to question the decree by appeal. He had no:tice 
of the hearing for distribution and he neither ·examined 
the petition before the hearing nor objected at the helar-
ing; nor did he appeal. 
All the cases cited hy counsel show deliberate bad 
faith and intentional fraud. In most of them, the fraud 
was "intrinsic." In further support of his contention 
that it is immaterial whether the fraud he claims was 
practiced, was ·'extrinsic'' or ''intrinsic,'' he quotes 
from Judge Rutlege in Ea.rl v. Picken, 113 F·ed. (2d) 150. 
/ 
(See Appellant's Brief pp. 86, 87). The rule_ announced 
by Judge Rutledge, even in a case where a fiduciary 
relation exists, that it is immaterial whether the fraud 
be ''extrinsic'' or ''intrinsic,'' is not the rule in this state 
as we have demonstrated by the Utah cases we have 
heretofore cited. 
Mere fai1lure of the res-p·ondent (if there was a fail-
ure, which we deny) to call the attention of the court 
to what he claims was the water right to the twenty-seven 
acres, would not have constituted such fraud as to justify 
setting aside the decree, and the mere fact th~t sh·e oc-
cupied a fidud~ary relation does not lend any support to 
such contention. 
In C~aldwell v. Taylor, (Cal) 23 Pae· (2d) 758, the 
court declares : 
''An analysis of the authorities upon the sub-
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ject of what fraud will warrant the aid of equity 
indicates that only upon proof of extrinsic or col-
lateral fraud can plaintiff seek and secure equit-
able relief from the judgment. A showing of 
fraud practiced in the trial of the original action 
will not suffice. The authorities hold this to be 
intrinsic fraud and uniformly hold that since there 
must be an end to 'litigation and the fraud was 
:part of the case presented in the former action, 
equity will not reopen the litigation.'' 
And the court quotes from U. S. v. Throckmor~on, 98 
U. S. 61, 65, 25 L. Ed. 93. 
In Da,vis v. Seavy, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 3-5, the exeCU.tor 
was charged in the complaint with having sup1p1ress;ed a 
co·dici,Z to the will, and in failing to cal'! it to the court's 
attention and in having distribution made to herself of 
all the estate as provided in the will. Says the court: 
''The only allegation of the complaint which 
in any way suggests fraud on the part of re-
spondent is that she, as executrix, came into pos-
session of the property and papers of the de-
ceased, including the alleged codicil, and that she 
did not make lmown to the court the existence 
of the codicil in the course of the administration 
of the estate. This in no event could amount to 
anything more than an allegation that respondent 
did not present to the court upon the final dis-
tribution hearing the true facts touching the ques-
tion of who is entitled to the property as distri-
butee. In other words, this is nothing more than 
an effort to avoid the deeree of distribution as a 
final adjudication because of the presenting of 
fa:lse :proof touching the merits of the question 
of who is entitled to the property of the estate as 
distributee. This is not groud for setting aside 
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a final decree rendered upon due notice as this 
decree of distri'bution \Vas rendered. In Meeker 
v. Waddle, 83 Wash. 628, 145 P'ac. 967, a similar 
situation 'vas presented in that the only ground of 
fraud alleged or attempted to he proven 'vas that 
the distributee falsely rep,resented that the land 
in controversy was the community property of 
hin1self and his deceased wife, whereas in truth 
it was her separate property. Holding that this 
was not ground for avoiding the decree of distri-
bution, Judge Holcomb, speaking for the court, 
observed: 
'' ·If decrees 'vere to be set aside upon the 
1nere ground that they were based upon perjured 
testimony, decrees might never become final, for 
the decree ,,~hich held that a former dec:vee was 
founded upon perjured testimony might itself 
later he attacked upon the ground that it was pro-
cured by perjured testimony, and so on ad infini-
tum·' Friedman v. l\fanley, 21 Wash. 675, 59 Pac. 
490; ~IcDougaJll v. Walling, 21 Wash. 478, 58 Pac-. 
669, 7'5 Am. St. Rep. 849. 
''The decisions of the courts are substantially 
unanimous in support of this view. We have 
noticed that appellant was not prevented from ap-
pearing and s·etting up her claim during the course 
of the administration of the estate, nor upon the 
final distribution hearing nor ·induced to refrain 
from so doing, by any word or act of respondent. 
These are the m~atters to which alleged fraud must 
reZate in order to be a~vailabLe in av10iditng the fiwal 
effect of ,a d,ecree rend.ered upon due wotice. We 
conclude that there was no cause for disturbing 
the decree on the ground of fraud.'' (Italics ours). 
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DECREE CONCL·USIVE CONSTRUCTION 
OF WILL 
The principle of law is well established that where 
a court has entered a decree which involves the distrihu-
tion of property under a will, in the absence of appea~l 
that decree is ~a final c:onsbruct~on of the will and that 
eonstruction must stand in the :absence of appeal. In 
Goode v. M~ontgomery, ('Cal.) 51 Pac. 682, tlhe court 
declares: 
"If the plaintiffs herein had felt that the de-
cree of distribution was erroneous or defective 
in not giving to them the powers which, in their 
opinion, the te·rms of the will authorized to be 
conferred upon them, they could have appealed 
therefrom, and had the decree corrected; but, 
·hy their failure to appeal, the decree has become 
conclusive upon them, and they can no longer 
con tend for a different construction than such 
as its terms in1port. (Citing cas-es).'' 
Again: 
''This distribution of the property, 'in lieu 
and in full satisfaction of the legacy of one mil-
lion dollars,' must he regarded as a construction 
by the court of the testator's intention in creating 
the trust, ·and is to be treialed .as if he h~ad cre,ated 
the trust in the terms used in the aecree." (Italics 
ours). 
In re Keet 's Estate (Cal.), 91 Pac. ( 2) 944, it is 
held that a decr·ee of distribution to heirs an'd to a 
trustee is final and conclusive upon all parties and is 
the measure of the rlights of all claimants under the wil'l; 
that it is a judicial oonstruction of the will and is to be 
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treated as if the testator had created the trust in the 
terms of the decree· 
Oounsel is so pressed in his attempt to impute fraud 
to the defendant that he remarks: 
''It is quite significant in this ·case that de~ 
fendant in the faee of all the evidence now known 
to her is still insisting on keep·ing Aus'tin's p·rop-
·erty, and that she has even gone to the lengths 
of saying that even if she was wrong, she still 
is entitled to keep it, and there is no court that 
can take away from her this ill-gotten prope;rty. 
She still refuses to make any effort to fulfill her 
fiduciary obligations, but is insisting with ·every 
means at her command, that she keep Austin fTom 
getting what his father willed him· She and her 
witnesses made no attempt to aid the court. Their 
whole effort ·even now is to withhold from the 
court the true facts." (App. Br. p. 92). 
Counsel allows his bitterness to guide his pen. His 
statem·ent is tantamount to saying that because respon-
dent does not accept as true the statements of Austin, 
she is still acting fraudulently because she insists on 
carrying out her understanding of her fiduciary obTiga-
tions and the express·ed direction of her fath·er when 
the will was prepared. Her undeTstanding of her duty 
is supported by the testimony of her brothers and other 
witnesses. Couns·e1l's concluding statement that the whole 
effort ''even now is to withhold from the court the true 
facts" is both unfair and untrue. 
Considering the situation of the p~arties, why ·should 
defendant have any desire to injure or defr~aud her 
brother' Is it to he inferred that f 1or the interest in 
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the estate which she will eventually receive, upon the 
death of her mother, she is so selfish and avaricious as 
to wish to keep him from receiving what his father in-
tended him to have~ Her demeanor and statements on 
the witness stand impressed the court and would impress 
any reasonable person that all her acts in this matter 
were based upon her honest he'lief and understanding 
that her father intended Austin to have the land west 
of the highway and that there was no water right from 
Davis Cr;eek appurtenant to such land. Neither she, nor 
any of her witnesses, have indicated uny inclination to 
withhold facts. The statement of counsel is p·reposterous. 
No Right to aeti:ef Without Proving Fraud 
At page fifty-five of his brief, couns-e'J states: 
"The question of what water Austin is en-
titled to may be determined without anyref.erence 
whatever to the question of fraud. The decree 
of distribution transferred the appurtenant water 
to him and the only problem with reference to the 
water is to determine what water was appurten-
ant to the decreed land. That water already has 
passed to Austin under the decree of distribution. 
It is not necessary to consider the question of 
fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the 
defendant with reference to the water. 
As fast as counsel discovers that he cannot main-
tain his position on one theory, he resorts to another. 
This court restrieted appellant's cause of action to ex-
trinsic fraud on the part of the respondent in keeping 
appellant from having his day in court. It was the alle-
gation that by her statement to him in the hallway of 
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the courthouse at Far:t:nington that he need not reinain 
at the hearing 'vhich caused hin1 to abs-ent himself, that 
induced this court to reverse the trial court's ruling on 
the general demurrer. However, as we have shown, there 
is no proof to support such allegation. N·ext counsel 
shifts to the theory of intrinsic fraud in th'at respondent 
did not represent the true state of facts to the court, and 
because she acted in a fiduciary capacity such conduct 
entitles appellant to have the decr·ee amended (See App. 
Br. 76-90). "\V e have already referred to the cases he 
cites, some of which ( ~ontrary to the rule in this state) 
seem to hold that a decree may be set aside for intrinsic 
fraud. On both these theories, counsel takes the pos,ition 
that the water right he claims is not included in the 
decree of distribution, for he alleges that ap·pellant 
"did not know until shortly before the filing 
of this petition that the said Erma Rice had not 
accurately represented to the court the p·roper de-
scription of the farm occupied by your petitioner, 
and did not know until shortly before the filing 
of this petition that the water us·ed on and ap-
purtenant to the farm was not included in the 
decree of distribution.'' (Rec. 78). 
Knowing full well that if this court adheres to the 
rule announced in W eyarnt v. Utah S~avings & Trust 
Contpany, Anderson v. St~at·e, Wright Construction Q,omr 
p,any, supra, and other decisions of this court, his claim 
of intrinsic fraud practiced by respondent furnishes no 
ground for relief, our nimble friend now says in the 
forego'ing quotation from his brief that it is not neces-
sary that he show any fraud, extrinsic or intrinsic 
' 
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because the decree carried the water which was appur-
tenant to the Austin Rice tract. In other words he claims 
that Austin :acquired by the decree what Erma deprived 
him of by not putting it in the decree; that she practiced 
fraud by withho1lding from the court information that 
the water right went with the land and thereby induced 
the court to leave the, water right out of the decree, 
which in fact, the decree gives him; that he has vested 
in h'im by the decree what was not included in the decree, 
and that this court should amend the de-cree to give him 
what the decree does not give him, but which it does 
give hi~m. This cobwebby double-talk of co:uns·el excites 
our :admiration, but suggests no reason why the decree 
of distribution should, or can he amended when under 
the rule, so well established that extrinsic fraud only 
can furnish a basis for an attack upon it when no appeal 
was taken. 
If, upon any theory, it can he said that under the 
pleadings in this case, :and the fiormer ruling of this 
court, the trial court was not limited to the one question 
of whether there was ·extrinsic fraud justifying an attack 
upon the decree of distribution, and that the court had 
the ri·ght, independently of the question of fraud, to 
adjudicate between the parties their respective rights 
to the waters of Davis Creek and to amend the decree 
accordingly, nevertheless, under the -evidence 'in this 
· case, there would be no justification for awarding appel-
lant any water right as appurtenant to his land. The 
m·ere fact that counsel contends that in the de·ed of this 
land to David L. Rice water rights are mentioned does 
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not signify that there was any water right ap~purtenant 
to this land at the tin1e of nir. Rice's death. The evidence 
clearly sho,Ys, and the court so finds: 
''that for more than thirty years prior to, 
and at the time of the death of David L. Rice, cer-
tain tracts of his lands 'vere surpplied with water 
and irrigated from Davis Creek in Davis County·, 
Utah; 
* * * * 
That said David L. Rice during said p~eriod 
irrigated from sixty to seventy acres of orchard, 
grain, hay and other crops located north of Davis 
Creek by means of what is known as North Ditch 
extending from Davis Creek, and after about th·e 
year 1919, did not use any water during his thirty-
two hour turn, through the White Ditch which 
extends from South Davis Creek, and is the only 
ditch through which said twenty-seven acre tract 
could he supplied with water, hut the court finds 
that after the said Austic Rice took up his resi-
dence on the twenty-seven acre tract in the Fall 
of 1937, at times during the freshet season and 
occasionally when 'vater was on turns, he used 
some water through said White Ditch, presum-
ably with his father's permission, for the irriga-
tion of approximately eight acres of orchard and 
garden, a part of said twenty -seven acre tract. '' 
( Rec. 123-124) . 
Now, if David L. Rice did originally acquire any 
water right with the twenty-seven acre tract at the time 
he pur'chased it, he certainly transferred that water to his 
lands to the north and used it on said lands as testified 
to by h'is sons -and other witnesses, and abandoned its 
use on the Austin Rice tract. Certainly he had a. right, 
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if he ever had any water with that land, to transfer 
such water right to the lands to the north of Davis Creek. 
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 3'57; Arnold v. Reser-
voi.r Company, 64 Utah 534. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Assignment of E.rror 
The court erred in holding and deciding: 
'' Th.at by ·reason of the facts found in para-
graph 8 hereof, the proportion of said thirty-two 
hour period which is ap,purtenant to the said eight 
acres of the Austin Rice farm was, and is four 
hours, that is to say, from one o 'elock A.M. until 
five o'clock A·M. Thursday morning of each week; 
(Finding 9, Rec. 124). 
the said finding being contrary to and not supported by 
the evidence. 
(''The facts found in paragraph 8'' above referred 
to are those set out in the last few lines of the above 
quotation shown at page 31 hereof). 
On the cross appeal, we need say no more in sup-
port of the foregoing assignment than that the court 
erred in decreeing appellant four hours of water when 
there is no evidence whatever, from either plaintiff's or 
defendant's witnesses, to justify the eourt in awarding 
appellant four hours. Furthermore, it is our contention 
appellant is entitled to no water right wha tev~r fron1 
Davis Creek; that the decree of distribution omitting 
the award to appellant of· any water right is a binding 
and conclusive interpretation of the will; and finally 
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that no fraud has been shown to justify a court of equity 
in upsetting said final decree. 
Respe·ctfully submitted, 
JES1SE R. S. BUDGE 
.Atvorney for Respovniie'fl)t and 
C ~oss-App.elZant. 
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